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CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATION -

THE PROPER ROLES OF

CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND ATTORNEYS
JONATHAN

0.

HAFEN*

Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental
authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1992 presidential election and the recent Florida case
In re Gregory K have brought the issue of children independently exercising their "rights" to the forefront of family law
debate among legal academia and the general public. Hillary
Rodham Clinton, wife of President Bill Clinton, has urged in
the past that the traditional presumption of a child's incapacity
to make legally binding decisions be reversed in certain circumstances in order to allow the child to have greater control over
decisions affecting his or her future.2 In re Gregory K, factually a
relatively routine parental rights termination case, gained
potentially historic proportions when the child hired his own
attorney and affirmatively sought to terminate the parental
rights of his natural parents. In that case, amicus curiae for
Gregory K. encouraged the court to reverse the presumption of
a child's legal incapacity in order to allow Gregory K. and other
children to sue on their own behalf. In re Gregory K, for
purposes of this article, is significant not on its own facts, but
* Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1988, Brigham
Young University; J.D. 1991, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. The author thanks Professor Bruce C. Hafen and Joy Miner
Hafen for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
2. Hillary Clinton's views are discussed more fully below. See infra
notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
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because of what it portends for attorneys representing
children.
In cases where the outcome of a legal proceeding significantly affects a child's life, the child's interests are represented
in a variety of fashions.' Because children by nature generally
lack the capacity to make decisions based on their own longterm best interests, and because state laws reflect that fact, 4
someone else often must make decisions on behalf of a child
which will be, in the view of the decisionmaker, in that particular child's best interests. That role has traditionally been the
parents' right and obligation.5 However, where the parents
3. Although historically such a statement would be disputed, today
courts almost universally recognize that a child's interests must be
represented in legal proceedings significantly affecting the child's future.
Where the interests of the child do not conflict with those of the parents,
often the interests of the child are implicitly represented by the parents.
Where the parents' interests may conflict with the best interests of the child,
courts appoint a guardian ad litem or other individual to speak on behalf of
the child. For a discussion on the types of proceedings in which a minor may
have the fight to counsel, see James K. Genden, SeparateLegal Representationfor
Children: Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 570-83 (1976); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to
Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representationfor Children, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 76 n.2 (1984). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 249
(McKinney 1983) (right to counsel in abuse and delinquency proceedings);
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.352 (Page 1976) (right to counsel in abuse and
delinquency proceedings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel in
juvenile delinquency proceedings); Guggenheim, supra, at n.170 (citing
statutes of 28 states mandating appointment of counsel in child-custody
proceedings). Note, however, that not all commentators agree that children
themselves should have the right to counsel. Some argue that in many
instances it is sufficient that the child's interests are adequately represented.
See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra, at 91 n.68 (parental privacy and autonomy rights
cut against a child's unimpeded right to counsel and should be taken into
account when deciding whether to appoint counsel for the child in divorcecustody, abuse and neglect, and termination of parental rights cases).
4. See Michael A. Olivas, Commentary: 'Breaking the Law' on Principle: An
Essay on Lawyers' Dilemmas, Unpopular Causes, and Legal Regimes, 52 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 815, 826 (1991) ("most civil and criminal codes presume children are
incapable of making legal judgments on their own.").
5. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]here is a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that
parents are the appropriate decisionmaker for their infants."); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (indicating that the parents' role is
to provide custody, care, and nurture for their child); see also JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1979)
(children under age eighteen often incapable of making decisions based on
their own best interests; parents most suited to making such decisions on
their child's behalf); Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacitiesfor Participationin
Treatment Decision-Making, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE
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forfeit that right through abuse, neglect or abandonment of the
child, or where a conflict of interest exists between the parents
and the child, the role of speaking for the child then traditionally has gone to a guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney.6
Whether or not the child is a party to the action, or whether a
guardian ad litem has been appointed, the court may also
choose to appoint an attorney to advocate the child's best interests. 7 Often, courts rely heavily on the advice provided by
these attorneys in making decisions which significantly affect
the child's future.' In addition, today, more than ever before,
children of different ages and maturity levels are bypassing
these traditional mechanisms of vicarious representation and
going straight to an attorney seeking legal representation of
what the child perceives to be in his or her own best interests.
Thus, the importance of the attorney's role in litigation involving children is readily apparent. Moreover, in each of these situations, the attorney usually possesses significant control over
the scope and course of the representation due to the child's
legal incapacity and consequent minority status and due to the
child's natural inability to control the course of the litigation.
The attorney often must decide whether to follow the instructions of a child who may not be mature enough to adequately
ascertain his or her own long-term best interests or whether to
disregard the wishes of a client, albeit a child. Even where the
LAw 22 (1985) (parents typically make decisions which are in the best
interests of their child); Robyn Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child:
The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 683 & n.14
(1987) ("The normal presumption is that parents will function as substitute
decisionmakers for their minor children.").
6. The guardian ad litem, as a neutral factfinder, then presents his or
her views on the best interests of the child to the court. The court, in
consultation with the guardian ad litem, then decides what is in the best
interests of the child and takes that into consideration in making the decisions
relevant to the particular proceeding. See generally Brian G. Fraser, Independent
Representationfor the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL.
W.L. REV. 16 (1976). See also Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974)
(guardian ad litem has the right to direct the litigation involving the child).
7. This most often occurs in situations such as divorce proceedings
where custody of the child is in dispute or where the parental rights of the
child's parents may be terminated.
8. See Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 102 ("Instead of making its own
judgments, the factfinder soon comes to rely on the judgment of the
attorneys. Instead of independently examining the facts and the law [on what
is in the child's 'best interests'], the factfinder asks only what the lawyers
think."). This often occurs because the amorphous "best interests" standard,
which most states require judges to apply in making such decisions, provides
little concrete guidance. See generally Christian R. Van Deusen, The Best Interest
of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 417, 419 (1991).
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attorney chooses to disregard the instructions of the child, the
attorney must then determine what course to pursue. This is
what some have called the "child advocacy dilemma." 9 Attorneys currently attempt to resolve this dilemma in different
ways. For some, the goal of the litigation is to achieve what the
attorney thinks would be in that particular child's best interests,
given that child's culture and background. Other attorneys
select as their goal what they believe is in the best interests of
children generally. In the second instance, the child may
merely serve as a means for the attorney to pursue a "greater
cause," allowing the cause to become the client. Currently,
ethical guidelines do not expressly prohibit such behavior.
These broad powers possessed by attorneys representing
children indicate that there is currently insufficient legislative
or judicial guidance defining the proper role of the attorney,
the child, and the child's parents where the child, directly or
indirectly, participates in litigation which may significantly
affect the child's future. Furthermore, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct likewise fail to provide an ethical compass to
guide the attorney of a child-client. As legal and public policymakers discuss possible standards for legal representation of
children, they must address two important issues. First, who is
in the best position to make the hard decisions children face:
the parents, the child, the state, the attorney representing the
child, or some combination? Second, assuming that the attorney is the one responsible for acting on behalf of the child,
what ethical standards control the conduct of that attorney in
light of the sometimes competing interests of the parents, the
child and even the attorney?
This article contends that attorneys representing children
currently have insufficient guidance or, in some cases, experience to answer these questions themselves. Therefore, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as the best vehicle for
9. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, The Paradox of Child Advocacy, in IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAw REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY
43, 50-51 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985) (discussing this dilemma); Martha
L. Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1889
(1987) ("The adult who offers the child's view, unmediated, may advance an
irrational or misguided position; the adult who supplies a preference other
than the child's has no obvious tether and lands in the thicket of general
uncertainty over what is good for the child."). Furthermore, this unfettered
discretion is generally not reviewable. See Lyon, supra note 5, at 689 ("The
lack of any check on such arbitrary decisionmaking by children's attorneys
injects a degree of arbitrariness into the judicial paradigm. Moreover,
decisions made by the attorney, unlike those made by a court, generally are
not subject to appellate review.").
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defining the attorney-client relationship, should be revised to
provide specific directions to attorneys representing children.
This article asserts that these modifications should reflect certain well-recognized principles in family and juvenile court law,
such as that deserving parents are uniquely qualified, and have
the constitutional right, to make decisions on behalf of their
minor child, especially where the child is involved in litigation.
This parental right must be preserved unless forfeited through
certain conflicts of interest or in instances where all parental
rights could lawfully be terminated due to abuse, abandonmenit, or neglect. By establishing standards ensuring participation of deserving parents in the decisionmaking process of the
attorney representing the child, the legal profession will preserve an important parental right, protect society's interest in
familial stability, and provide for the long-term best interests of
the child. Attorneys will likewise benefit from such guidelines
because the child advocacy dilemma will be, to some extent,
resolved.
Section II of this article analyzes the concept of "children's
rights." In section III, the article focuses on problems arising
from attorneys representing children. Section IV discusses the
insufficient guidance which the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct currently provide attorneys representing children and
proposes an amendment to the Model Rules to remedy this situation. Section V includes some finalcomments.
II.

WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILDREN INVOLVED
IN LITIGATION?

Generally, states must refrain from invoking jurisdiction
over intra-family disputes.O However, certain exceptions
apply, such as in cases of parental misconduct, where, for
example, the child has been a victim of abuse or neglect." In
addition, states are allowed to intervene in instances-of family
reorganization where custody disputes or foster care issues
arise. States also may be required to hear cases in which a child
has been charged with delinquency or criminal misconduct.
Finally, state involvement may be necessary where a child seeks
to exercise a previously unrecognized right of preference. This
10.

See Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 109 ("The right of the family to be

free from significant state interference
jurisprudence.") (citing cases).
11.

is fundamental

in. American

Van Duesen, supra note 8, at 419 ("In the juvenile court system, not

only do courts require a finding that a parent is 'unfit' before intervening,
that finding must be by clear and convincing evidence.").
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final category includes the scenario in which a child attempts
independently of his or her parents to invoke a court's jurisdiction to pursue a "right" unrelated to unlawful conduct by the
child's parents. Important legal questions not yet resolved
include whether a child's legal incapacity prevents such unilateral actions, and, if so, whether a reversal of the presumption
of incapacity would be a wise course to pursue.
A.

The Issues Raised By In re Gregory K.

One now well-known case which some have called a
"landmark" decision is In re Gregory K. In this case, an eleven
year-old boy sought the right to unilaterally terminate the
parental rights of his natural parents so that he could be
adopted by his foster parents. The court ultimately determined
that Gregory had standing to bring suit in his own name and
subsequently ruled in Gregory's favor. 2 This case is important
because of its potential impact on a child's right to seek state
intervention into familial relationships by suing in his or her
own name, rather than through parents or a guardian ad litem
as is currently required.' 3 Although children currently do not
widely possess such a right, there is some concern that if they
do, children and their attorneys may attempt to use the judicial
system as a means to either compel parents to raise their children in a manner which gives greater deference to the child's
autonomy or to escape poverty by "shopping" for a more affluent family. Such issues did arise, peripherally, in the Gregory K.
case. By way of a defense, Rachel K., the boy's natural mother,
asserted her belief that the real reason that Gregory was seeking the termination of her parental rights was not because she
had abandoned him, but because he would have a more comfortable lifestyle and greater opportunities with his foster family. 4 This assertion touched off a bitter debate over the rights
12.
13.

In re Gregory K., Case No. 92-839-CA-01 (5th Cir. Fla. 1992).
In fact, since the Gregory K. case was handed down, several other

children have tried to bring similar suits, with mixed success. See, e.g., Another
12-Year-Old Seeks to "Divorce" Parents, CH. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1992, § 1, at 10
(discussing the case of a 12-year-old Mississippi boy who now is seeking
termination of his natural parents' parental rights); From Chattelto Full Citizens,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 88 [hereinafter Chattelto Citizens] (discussing the
case of a 16-year-old who sued her father for $142 a month support after the
father locked her out of the house for failing to take a drug-related psychiatric
evaluation).
14. Rachel K. made the following statement to the press:
[H]is brothers go swimming at the public pool and he goes
swimming at the country club.... Which would you rather do if you
were 11 years-old? You'd want the same things if you were a little

1993]

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION

of children to unilaterally improve their lives through litigation
against their parents. As a result of this debate, several other
cases have come to light which present the issue of a child
suing over lifestyle choices - without a finding of parental
unfitness - in a much clearer way than the Gregory K case. 5 An
example of such a case is In re Snyder.
In In re Snyder, 6 a fifteen-year-old child successfully sought
to have a court declare her "incorrigible" and remove her from
her family following disputes with her parents over her friends,
her dating, and her desire to smoke. 17 Remarkable here is the
fact that the court also found that the parents had not abused,
abandoned or neglected their daughter. From all appearances
in the briefs and the opinions, the parents were "fit" to raise
their child. In fact, evidence in the record suggested that
[e]mployees of the juvenile court and the Department of
Social and Health Services advised [the child] not to
return home, encouraged her to file the dependency petitions, and failed to provide counseling for her or urge
her to attempt a reconciliation with her parents.' 8
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Washington, citing "hostilities" between the parents and the child due to the parents
being "strict disciplinarians,"' 9 upheld the finding of the trial
judge that it would be in the "best interests" of the child to
kid and had gone from being poor to having Nintendo and a little
water bed of your own. I wasn't even able to buy my kids a bike, and
in a child's world those are big things.
Boy Sues to "Divorce" Parents, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1992, at AI I [hereinafter Boy
Sues].
15. The evidence introduced at trial suggested that Gregory had, in
fact, been abandoned by his natural mother. The trial court expressly found
that to be the case. For this reason, In re Gregory K. will not likely become
widely recognized precedent for the proposition that children can sue their
parents over lifestyle choices in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness.
16. 532 P.2d 278 (Wash. 1975); see also Comment, Status Offenses and the
Status of Children's Rights: Do Children Have the Legal Right to Be Incorrigible?,
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (discussing implications of In re Snyder).
17. 532 P.2d at 279.
18. These allegations were presented by affidavit in the original
complaint and quoted by the Court of Appeals when it reviewed and affirmed
a lower court dismissal of the parents' claim of tortious interference with
family relationships, which the parents filed following the original decision.
See Superior Court for King County, Case No. 777930 (1976) (dismissing
claim of tortious interference with family relationships); Snyder v. State, 577
P.2d 160 (Wash. App. 1976) (affirming dismissal and ruling that "no injustice
has been done").
19. 532 P.2d at 279.
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remove her from her home. And it did so, "irrespective of the
' 20
natural emotions in cases of this nature.
The Supreme Court of Washington also found that in disputes between parents and children that give rise to suits of
this kind, "the issue of who is actually responsible for the
'
breakdown of the parent-child relationship is irrelevant. "21
Such a case provides troublesome precedent for courts which
may now take up similar issues as an increasing number of children seek to sue in their own name on such matters. It indicates that despite the best efforts of parents to raise their child,
their parental rights may be terminated by the child even where
22
there is no finding of parental unfitness.
Another case receiving widespread public attention in the
wake of In re Gregory K is In re A. W. 2 This case, much more so
than In re Gregory K., calls into question the wisdom of allowing
children to independently hire and direct their own attorneys.
In re A. W is the case of a thirteen-year-old Chicago girl
who had been sexually abused by her stepfather since she was
three. Following years of this sexual abuse, the girl's stepfather
was convicted of sexually assaulting her. He was released after
serving four years of his sentence for that crime. Following her
stepfather's release from prison, the girl, currently in foster
care because her mother was determined to be an unfit parent,
sought permission from the juvenile court to resume overnight,
unsupervised visits with her mother and stepfather. The girl's
court-appointed guardian ad litem refused to advocate this
20. Id. at 281. For some, such emotions may well dictate that in the
absence of a finding of abuse, abandonment, neglect, or other evidence of
parental unfitness, courts should be loathe to interfere in intra-family
disputes over lifestyle issues.
21. Id.
22. This despite the fact that state law generally mandates that "[t]he
termination of parental rights is an extreme action, justified only upon clear
and convincing evidence of [parental] unfitness .... " Davis v. Bughdadi, 458
N.E.2d 177, 181 (Ill. App. 1983); see also, In re Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Ill.
1990) ("Precisely because of the devastating effect produced by termination

of parental rights, the evidence of a parent's unfitness has to be clear and
convincing."); In re R.L.M., Jr., 807 P.2d 161 (Kan. 1991) (same and citing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(a), which mandates this standard); In re Steven T.,
393 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1986) (same); In re M.B., 509 A.2d 1014, 1017
(Vt. 1986) (same); In re Baby Boy C., 581 A.2d 1141, 1177 (D.C. App. 1990)
("A court . . . cannot constitutionally use the 'best interests' standard to

terminate the parental rights of a 'fit' natural father ... and, instead, grant an
adoption in favor of strangers simply because they are 'fitter.' ").

23.

Case No. 86J 3561 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Juvenile Division). See

also Chattel to Citizens, supra note 13, at 84 (In re A.W. shows that children "may

not always know their own best interests.").

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION

1993]

position on behalf of the child, arguing instead that visits
should be supervised and occur during the day.
After learning of this situation, a local attorney, Barry A.
Miller, stepped forward and offered to replace the courtappointed guardian ad litem as the child's legal representative.
Mr. Miller stated the following to the press at that time: "This
fight is not about the child's right to have her wishes granted;
that's up to the judge. [This fight] is about the right to have
her voice heard in the legal process. The question is whether a
child can be considered adequately represented by a courtappointed attorney who refuses to advocate for what she
wants." 2 4
In a September 4, 1992 order, the trial court granted the
motion for substitution and Mr. Miller became the girl's counsel despite the arguments of the Cook County Public Guardian
that such a move would not be in the girl's long-term best
interests. Hearings on the substantive matter - whether the
child will be permitted to resume the unsupervised, overnight
visits with her stepfather - concluded in late March 1993 and a
decision is expected in early summer 1993.
Regardless of the outcome of the case, In re A. W compellingly illustrates the incapacity of some children to fully appreciate what is in their own long-term best interests. This case
also stands as a stark example of the dangers involved in
allowing an attorney to zealously pursue goals dictated by an
immature child-client where there is no fit parent to direct the
course of the litigation. 25
B.

Hillary Rodham Clinton and Children's Rights

During the recent presidential election, right-wing conservatives spent a great deal of time vehemently arguing that
the election of Bill Clinton would lead to a deterioration of the
American family due to the influence of his wife, Hillary
Rodham Clinton. 26 While it is clear that Hillary Rodham Clin24. Jan Hoffman, When a Child-Client Disagrees with the Lawyer, N.Y.
Aug. 28, 1992, at B6.
25. For a more detailed discussion on this aspect of the case, see infra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
attorneys' conduct in In re A.W.).
26. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, GOP Targets Hillary Clinton's Views on
Family, But Some Experts Cite Distortion of Her Position, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
1992, at A14; Ruth Mavens, Republicans Aim Barbs at Hillary Clinton, WASH.
POST, Aug. 19, 1992, at A21; Ben J. Wattenberg, The Lady Macbeth of Little
Rock: Hillary Clinton's Hard-Left Past and Present, AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 1992, at
25.

TIMES,
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ton, an important advocate in the "children's rights movement" of the 1970s, does have some influence over President
Clinton's policy and appointments to posts within his administration, 2 7 it is still unclear whether her views on the family have
changed since the 1970s, 28 and, if not, whether they will
become an important part of the Clinton Administration's
agenda.2 9 Even so, the importance of her previously expressed
views on the family - both in their potential to shape the presidential policy and in their current impact on topical family law
issues ° - compel consideration, especially in light of the current public interest in children's rights due to the Gregory K
case. Therefore, this portion of the article focuses on Hillary
Rodham Clinton's views on children's rights, including her
stand on the legal representation of children."'
27. This is evidenced by the appointment of friends of Hillary Clinton
to high-ranking posts throughout the administration. Several of these
appointees became known to Ms. Clinton through their mutual association
with the Children's Defense Fund, a Washington D.C.-based public interest
organization focusing on the needs of children, which Ms. Clinton chaired for
several years. See, e.g., LiberalActivism Signaled, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1992, at
Al ("Miss Shalala, who succeeded Hillary Rodham Clinton as Chairman of
the Children's Defense Fund, was one of four persons named to top posts
yesterday.").
28. Note, however, that in an interview with National Public Radio last
year, Ms. Clinton indicated continued dissatisfaction with the presumption of
a child's incompetence. Hillary Clinton's Views Controversial (NPR radio
broadcast, Morning Edition, Aug. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Views Controversial]
(Ms. Clinton stated: "To assume that every child under a certain age, say 18
or 21, is incompetent is to treat . . . a 17-year-old like a one-year-old, and I
don't think that's a very sensible proposal.").
29. However, it is widely speculated that Ms. Clinton will initiate some
action on behalf of children. See, e.g., Baird Flap Overlooks Key Question: Who's
Minding the Kids, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1993, § 1, at 29 [hereinafter Baird Flap]
(children's rights important to Ms. Clinton, it remains to be seen what her
goals in this area are or how they will be achieved); T V. 's Education Plan and
Children's Rites: Rhetoric Under Reconstruction?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at
Gl ("Children's rights are to Hillary Rodham Clinton what tulip bulbs were
to Lady Bird Johnson, a china place setting to Nancy Reagan, illiteracy to
Barbara Bush - the private public passion of a public-spirited first lady.").
30. Among recent articles citing Ms. Clinton's early legal writings are
Minow, supra note 8, at 1868; Maureen Ann Delaney, Comment, What About
Children? Toward an Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the District of
Columbia, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 107 (1991); Lois A. Weithorn, Note, Mental
Hospitalizationof Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40
STAN.

L.

REV.

773 (1988).

31. One limitation here is that Hillary Clinton has not often publicly
presented her views on these subjects since her husband became Governor of
Arkansas. Thus, it is possible that her views on these issues have changed.
Nevertheless, as noted above, her views have become an important part of
the debate over children's rights.
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Hillary Rodham Clinton was one of the earliest and most
articulate voices speaking out for children's liberation. During
the early part of her legal career, she wrote several influential
articles on children's rights and worked for the Children's
Defense Fund. 2 One of the primary goals of that organization,
then and now, is to encourage federal assistance for poor and
underprivileged children.3 3 It appears that many of her earlier
legal writings were written with this goal in mind. 4
In these early writings, Hillary Rodham Clinton advocated
taking certain steps to allow children to have more control over
important decisions which are made on their behalf.3 5 In one
of her earliest articles, Ms. Clinton proposed a three-step plan
to achieve this goal of "children's liberation." First, she advocated that "the legal status of infancy, or minority, should be
3 6
abolished and the presumption of incompetency reversed;
next she urged that "all procedural rights guaranteed to adults
under the Constitution should be granted to children whenever
the state or a third party moves against them, judicially or
administratively; 3' 7 and finally, she asserted that "the presumption of identity of interests between parents and their
32. From 1986 through 1992, Ms. Clinton served as the chair of that
organization. Margaret E. Kriz, Political Hot Potato, 24 NAT'LJ. 2008 (1992).
33. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
34. See, e.g., Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 487, 491 (1973) [hereinafter Rodham, Children Under the Law]; see also
Hillary Rodham, Children's Policies: Abandonment and Neglect, 86 YALE LJ. 1522
(1979) (reviewing GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE CHILDREN'S CAUSE (1976)).
35. Hillary Clinton seems fundamentally opposed to relationships of
dependency because such dependency leads those in power to act in their
own best interests rather than in the best interests of the powerless. For
example, Ms. Clinton has likened children's dependency on their parents to
the historical dependency which women had on their husbands, as well as to
slavery and the Indian reservation system. Rodham, Children Under the Law,
supra note 34, at 493.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. This position finds some support in several contemporaneous
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966);
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244-45 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J.
dissenting) (arguing that children's decisionmaking capacity increases as they
approach the age of adulthood and, therefore, such children should have a
voice in determining the course of their education). Note, however, that the
court has chosen not to expand "children's rights" in the manner advocated
by Ms. Clinton. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MICH. L. REV. 463, 511-17 (1983); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING
LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 62-63 (1982).
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children should be rejected whenever the child has interests
demonstrably independent of those of his parents (as determined by the consequences to both of the act in question), and a
competent38child
should be permitted to assert his or her own
.
'
interests.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to provide
an in-depth critique of these proposals, some observations relevant to this article are in order. Implementing Hillary Clinton's proposals today would mean that many of the legal
protections won for children over the years would no longer be
in force, because they are justified only under the concept of a
child's minority status. 39 Reimposing those laws would be difficult, due to another argument Hillary Rodham Clinton makes
that any age-based laws should be subjected to strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review, requiring that a state
show both a compelling state interest in the law and that there
are no other 4less
restrictive means to achieve the compelling
0
state interest.
Moreover, and most importantly for purposes of this
article, Hillary Rodham Clinton asserted that "competent
38. Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 34, at 507.
39. See, e.g., Gammons v. Berlat, 696 P.2d 700, 701 (Ariz. 1985)
(construing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501 as establishing a rebuttable
presumption that children under the age of 14 do not appreciate the
wrongfulness of conduct as fully as adults); Beggs v. Wilson, 272 A.2d 713,
714 (Del. 1970)(conclusive presumption that children under a certain age are
incapable of contributory negligence); Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116
So.2d 421 (Fla. 1959) (enforcing statute prohibiting sale of firearms to
minors); Wilson v. State, 39 So. 471, 472 (Fla. 1905) (conclusive presumption
that female child under ten years of age cannot consent to intercourse or
sexual abuse); People v.Johnson, 542 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ill.
App. 1989) (child
pornography illegal because children cannot lawfully consent to sexual
exploitation).
40. Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 34, at 512. This would
create a very troubling situation. For example, under Hillary Clinton's
proposals, children could consent to sexual intercourse with adults because
statutory rape laws, grounded on a child's minority status, would be
abolished. Legislative attempts to reimpose such laws above a potentially
very young age would be extremely difficult under Hillary Clinton's proposed
strict scrutiny standard. While this may seem to be a worst-case scenario,
note that two adult males in Florida recently successfully contested their
statutory rape charges on the grounds that the girls involved, aged 15 and 16,
were mature enough to consent to intercourse; a claim both girls vocally
supported. Mike Clary, Should a Minor Have the Right to Say Yes?, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1992, at El. The judge agreed, ruling that the rights of privacy
protecting a mature minor's right to an abortion must necessarily also protect
a mature minor's right to consent to the act which may lead to an abortion.
Id. Addressing the weaknesses of this reasoning is beyond the scope of this
article.
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children" should be permitted to assert their own interests
under certain circumstances. 4 ' Because there would be a presumption of capacity - rather than the current presumption of
incapacity - for all children,4 2 children would be able to hire
and direct attorneys unless this presumption could be overcome. Logically, the existence of such a presumption makes
assertion of its opposite more difficult; thus, it would be much
more likely under Ms. Clinton's proposal that children would
be found competent to act on their own behalf than it is under
current law. 43 Moreover, Hillary Rodham Clinton also stated
that children should have the right to counsel in all types of
proceedings and that the child-client should be able to control
the scope and course of the litigation." She goes so far as to
suggest that it should be a violation of an attorney's professional responsibility for the attorney to determine the child's
best interests on behalf of the child.4 5 Therefore, under Ms.
41. Apparently, Ms. Clinton still maintains this view. See Views
Controversial,supra note 28 (Ms. Clinton asserting that it is "not sensible" to
presume that all children are incompetent to assert their rights).
42. Elsewhere, Hillary Clinton argues that the reversal of the
presumption of incapacity better prepares children for adulthood because it
requires them to take on responsibility at an earlier age. Hillary Rodham,
Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES 32 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). She
apparently believes this to be superior to parental control in which
responsibility for decisionmaking is meted out according to a parental
determination of the capability of their child to make important decisions. Id.
43. Indeed, that is the purpose behind the proposal. The danger is that
courts would not want to take the responsibility for deciding on behalf of the
child and therefore would be much more likely to allow the child to act on his
or her own behalf. Because "legal capacity" is a vague term which would be
difficult to prove in court, the effect of reversing the presumption of
incapacity would drastically impact cases involving minors. This is so because
courts would be hesitant to reverse a presumption where there are no clear
grounds to do so. Empirical evidence supports this assertion. In his study of
the aftermath of Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), an abortion rights
case in which minor girls could petition the court to determine whether they
were mature enough to decide to get an abortion themselves or, in the
alternative, whether an abortion would be in their best interests, Professor
Mnookin learned that every one of the 1300 pregnant minors who sought an
abortion through judicial authorization received one. MNooKIN, supra note 9,
at 329. This is not to say that all of these judges were necessarily pro-choice
as much as it is to say that judges in general are not willing to contest a
legislatively imposed presumption that girls should have an avenue to an
abortion.
44. Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note 34, at 495.
45. Id. ("[E]ven the child's own lawyer will likely go beyond the scope
of his professional responsibility in determining for himself and for the child
where the child's best interests lie.").
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Clinton's proposal, it would be up to the child himself or herself to decide what is in his or her own long-term best interests,
a difficult 4task
for children generally and for younger children
6
especially.
This article will next explore the definition, history and
current status of "children's rights." An analysis of parental
rights and obligations then follows. The article then proceeds
to discuss the proper role of parents, children and attorneys,
where children are involved in litigation.
C.

The Debate Over Rights

-

Children's Rights, ParentalRights,

and Duties of the State
1. What Are "Children's Rights?"
a.

Introduction

There is no clear-cut definition of the term "children's
rights." Perhaps the best way to define it is by categorizing
some of the meanings given the term by various courts and
authors. First of all, the term "children's rights" can refer
either to legally enforceable rights or it can refer to rights
which children ought to have, but may never receive, such as
the right to grow up in a peaceful world. The former category
can be further broken down into essentially three groups: (1)
legal rights of protection, (2) legal rights of choice,4 7 and (3)
unrecognized "rights" which some advocates argue should be
legally enforceable, but currently are not. Within the group of
46. Hillary Rodham Clinton would, under certain circumstances, also
allow children to challenge parental decisions made on their behalf.
Rodham, supra note 42, at 26. This stance, combined with the Gregory K. case
discussed above, began the media furor over her views on children's rights.
See, e.g., Eleanor Clift, Hillary Clinton's Not So Hidden Agenda, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
21, 1992, at 90; Douglas Laycock, What Hillary Clinton Really Said, WALL ST.J.,
Sept. 16, 1992, at A15. However, Hillary Clinton restricted such suits to

instances in which the child could be irreparably injured by the parents'
decision, such as "decisions about motherhood and abortion, schooling,
cosmetic surgery, treatment of venereal disease, or employment, and others
where the decision or lack of one will significantly affect the child's future."
Id.

Query whether the inclusion of "schooling" would invalidate existing

mandatory education laws and whether "employment" would invalidate
existing child labor laws.
47. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their 'Rights', 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605, 644; AndrewJ. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents,

and The State, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 320, 321-22 (1970). For an impressive discussion
of the historical context of modern children's rights from a revisionist's
perspective, see Barbara B. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child? Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).

19931

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION

rights of protection are the right to be free from parental abuse
and neglect, the right to be free from unwarranted searches
and seizures, 48 the right to be free from unreasonable working
conditions, the right to be exempt from military service, the
right to special treatment when charged with committing a
crime, 49 and the right to counsel before institutionalization. 5 °
Within the much smaller group of rights of choice are the right
to terminate a pregnancy5 and the right to freedom of expression.5 2 Some of the rights in each of the first two groups are
similar to rights enjoyed by adults but have additional restrictions, while others expressly distinguish between adults and
children.5" A third group of "children's rights" are those
48. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (recognizing that
children possess Fourth Amendment rights, although such rights may differ
from those enjoyed by adults). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)
(denying minors a liberty interest against freedom from certain types of
detentions).
49. See generally Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A
Response to Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 163.
50. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 & n.13
(1986).
51. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The
minor's right to choose to have an abortion is not absolute. See H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (states may impose a parental notification
requirement on unemancipated minors seeking abortions). Another case
involving a minor's right to choose an abortion is Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979), which involved a challenge to a Massachusetts law requiring
minors seeking an abortion to first obtain parental consent. While
supporting the rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit, the
Court nevertheless struck down the law and imposed a requirement that
while parental notification could be one option, there had to be an
alternative. The law eventually passed in response to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bellotti provided that where children could not get or would not
seek parental consent for an abortion, they could instead go to a judge on
their own behalf and seek a judicial determination of competency to decide
for themselves whether to get an abortion. If the judge determined that the
minor was competent, then she could obtain the abortion without obtaining
parental consent. If the child was deemed incompetent by the judge, then
the judge would then have to determine whether the abortion was in the best
interests of the child.
52. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969). Note, however, that since Tinker, the Supreme Court has limited
a minor's freedom of expression within a school. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). This decision seems to heed Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Tinker, in which he wrote that "[a] State may
permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child
...is not possessed of the full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515
(Stewart, J. concurring).
53. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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rights which have not yet received widespread express judicial
recognition and which mainly relate to lifestyle, such as the
right to "a quality education tailored to meet the individual's
needs,"' or the right to -befree from parental restrictions on
lifestyles.5 5 Rights in this third group are also generally
"choice rights," although one could argue that the right to be
free from undue parental restrictions is actually a "protection
right."
When discussing the difficult concept of "children's
rights," it is important to keep in mind that children, by their
nature and consequently by statutory and common law, do not
have the capacity to make certain fundamental choices about
their own lives. 6 For example, minors under a certain age
generally cannot validly contract,5 7 marry,5" and, despite a contrary trend, sue or be sued. 9 Instead, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that parents are the appropriate decisionmakers for their children in these circumstances. 6' In addition, there are other restrictions imposed by the state on the
child regardless of parental preferences, such as age-based
restrictions on the right to vote, drive, or purchase alcohol,
tobacco or pornographic materials. In these instances, the
state is intervening in the autonomy of the child and the parents in order to protect the child. The legal rationale for these
restrictions is the minority status of children, which is a reflection of the natural incapacity of children to make certain decisions which would be in their own long-term best interests.
The obvious fundamental reason for the presumption of
incapacity (and consequent minority status of children) is that
immature children, which all children are at some point, are
54. Minow, supra note 9, at 1868.
55. At least one court has implicitly adopted this right, as discussed
above. See In re Snyder, 532 P.2d 278 (Wash. 1975); see also, Comment, supra
note 16. However, this case has not received widespread attention by
commentators or by federal or state judiciaries.
56. The legal concept of lack of capacity due to infancy relaxes as the
child matures.
57. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§§ 222-48 (3d ed. 1959), cited by Lyon, supra note 5, at 683 n.9.
58. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 22 J.
FAM. L. 1 (1983-84) (reviewing various state laws on marital age restrictions).
59. For a list of cases and statutes on these restrictions, see Lyon, supra
note 5, at 682-84.
60. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 628 n.13
(1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
REPORT 212-14 (1983))

MEDICINE AND

BIOMEDICAL

BEHAVIOR

RESEARCH,

("[T]here is a presumption, strong but rebuttable,
that parents are the appropriate decisionmaker for their infants.").
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incapable of exercising reasoned.judgment about what is best
for them. 6 For this -reason; parents ordinarily have the
responsibility to make decisions on their child's behalf.62 In
other words, children do-not have the capacity to make certain
important decisions regarding their own welfare.63 Where the
child cannot make such decisions, the decisionmaking responsibility ordinarily falls to the parents, who may or may not
choose to consult with the child in reaching a decision. This
right of the parents to act on behalf of their child has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court as one of constitutional
dimensions.'
If the parents are disqualified from making
these decisions through a judicial or administrative finding of
"unfitness," then the decisionmaking role falls to the State in
its role ofparens patriae.6 5 In this way, children are prepared for
independent decisionmaking when the proper time comes.6 6
Based on the foregoing, some commentators argue that
great caution should be exercised in granting rights of choice
to children because children, by nature and by legal definition,
often do not have the capacity to make choices based on their
own long-term best interests.6 7 Others contend that the pre61. See Guggenheim, supra, note 3, at 85 n.23, 94 n.77 (and sources
cited therein); Lyon, supra note 5, at 695,. ("Children may fail to comprehend
crucial concepts, issues, or the possible consequences of their decisions.
They may also fantasize or be prone to indecisive or inconsistent behavior.").
62. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (allowing
Amish parents to remove their children from compulsory education beyond
. ,
the eighth grade).
63. As the Supreme Court has concluded, the state has an interest "in
protecting a juvenile from his own folly." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265
(1984) (quoting People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 350 N.E.2d 906, 909-10
(1976)).
64. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925).
65. This sentiment is echoed by several Supreme Court opinions. For
example, in Schall, the Court stated that "[c]hildren, by definition, are not
assumed to have capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be
subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the
State must play its part parens patriae." Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
66. Obviously, there are some restrictions placed on the parents'. right
to make decisions on behalf of their children. In Pierce, for example, the
Court held that there is "no question" that the State has the power "to
require that all children of proper age attend some school." Id. at 538.
Other limitations are in the areas of child labor, infant marriage, abortion and
contraception, access to necessary medical treatment, and severe physical
deprivation. See Lyon, supra note 5, at 683-84 (and cases cited therein);
ElizabethJ. Sher, Note, Choosing For Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes
Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1983); Note, The Minor's
Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305
(1974).
67. See, e.g. John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, 1 NOTRE
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sumption of incapacity should be reversed. For example, as
discussed more fully above, Hillary Rodham Clinton has
argued in the past that children should be presumed to have
the capacity to make legally binding choices under certain circumstances. 68 Ms. Clinton has stated her belief that this
approach, rather than a parental discretion model, best serves
to prepare children for adulthood by giving them substantial
responsibility at an early age. 69
b.

The History of the Children's Rights Movement

The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s did not
regard children as a group in need of increased "civil rights."
One reason for this was that a children's protection movement
decades earlier successfully sought passage of laws which, for
example, protect children from exploitation as laborers,7 °
ensure that children will receive an education, 7 ' and mandate
that children accused of committing criminal acts receive special treatment through the juvenile court system. 7 2 Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, a "kiddie lib" movement began. Two
fundamental principles underlying this movement were (1) that
any restriction on freedom was inherently repugnant to rights
guaranteed all Americans under the Constitution, and (2) that
children, especially those belonging to minority groups, were
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 495, 500-10 (1985); Hafen, supra note 47, at
647-48.
68. Left Wing Now Sounds Right, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at 40
(quoting Hillary Clinton as wanting to abolish "the legal presumption of the
incompetence of minors in favor of a presumption of competence").
69. Rodham, supra note 42, at 32.
70. See, e.g., Frazey v. Hoar, 492 P.2d 1316 (Kan. 1972) (discussing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-602, a child labor law protecting children from
dangerous working conditions); Mott v. River Parish Maintenance, Inc., 432
So.2d 827 (La. 1983) (discussing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:161, a child labor
law protecting children from dangerous working conditions or activities);
Vincent v. Riggi & Sons, Inc., 30 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1972) (interpreting
N.Y. LA. LAW §§ 30-33, 70-73, child labor laws which the court held were
still serving their primary purpose of protecting children from injury).
71. See, e.g., Ogle v. Ogle, 156 So.2d 345 (Ala. 1963) (discussing ALA.
CODE §§ 297, 301, compulsory education laws requiring public or private
education of children aged seven to sixteen); In re B.B., 440 N.W.2d 594
(Iowa 1989) (discussing IOWA CODE §§ 299.1, 299.5, 299.6, compulsory
education law requiring public or private education of children aged seven to
sixteen).
72. See, e.g., Ex parte J.D.G., 604 So.2d 378, 381 (Ala. 1992) ("The
general purpose of the juvenile justice Act is to 'facilitate the care, protection
and discipline of children .... .'"); State v. Russell, 625 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.
1981) (purposes of juvenile court system are protective and rehabilitative).
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being unfairly and tragically victimized by the poverty and discrimination inflicted on their parents.
For example, some commentators asserted at the time that
classifying children as minors, which formed the basis for the
age-based laws protecting children from themselves and
others, was itself oppressive. One commentator, who favored
"liberating" children from minority status and "freeing" them
from age-based restrictions on the right to marry, vote, and
contract, made the following argument:
[A]sking what is good for children is beside the point.
We will grant children rights for the same reason we
grant rights to adults, not because we are sure that children will then become better people, but more for ideological reasons, because we believe that expanding
freedom as a way of life is worthwhile.
If all this sounds too open and free, we must recognize
that in this society ... we are
not likely to err in the direc73
tion of too much freedom.
Despite the lack of evidence of harm to the child under the status quo or benefits to the child through granting unlimited
rights of choice to children, adherents to this view contended
that children should be free from restrictions for freedom's
sake and regardless of the consequences to the long-term wellbeing of the child, the family, and society. 4
Other commentators, rather than seeking the liberation of
children for liberation's sake, instead saw children as the most
tragic victims of poverty and discrimination and in need of
additional government assistance. 75 This led to activists making children the focal point of campaigns to reform the social
climate of the day. 76 These efforts resulted in some needed
73. RICHARD E. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 31, 153 (1974).
74. See, e.g., JOHN C. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18-19 (1974)
(contending that children should have the right to vote, be financially
independent, choose where to live, and choose where to attend school); GARY
MELTON ET AL., CHILDREN'S CAPACITY TO CONSENT

(1983).

75. See, e.g., Seymour Feshbach & Norma D. Feshbach, Child Advocacy
and Family Privacy, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 168 (1978); James Garbarino et al., Who
Owns Children? An Ecological Prospective on Public Policy Affecting Children, in
LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES

60 (Gary Melton

ed., 1982).
76. The Children's Defense Fund and The National Center for Youth
Law, now two of the largest organizations seeking sufficient and improved
government assistance for children, were formed at this time. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW, THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS

supra note 33.

(1991);

ANNUAL REPORT,
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changes. Children, especially those from disadvantaged
groups, were given additional procedural protections in various settings. For example, the Supreme Court, to some extent,
redefined the relationship between the state and the child,
imposing new constitutionally required7 procedural standards
7
on juvenile courts and public schools.
However, unlike the civil rights movement, the Supreme
Court never fully embraced the "kiddie lib" aspect of the children's rights movement. Since the late 1960s, when that era of
the children's rights movement began, the Supreme Court has
accorded different levels of constitutional protection to the different types of children's rights described above. For instance,
the Supreme Court has given no constitutional protection to a
child's right to exercise unlimited discretion in all situations,
unfettered by parental or state involvement in the decisionmaking process; however, the Supreme Court has granted children
the right to choose in some limited circumstances, such as state
regulation of abortion; 78 and the Supreme Court has given
constitutional status to some procedural rights of protection.7 9
This hierarchy of constitutional treatment of children's rights
acknowledges that limitations on the child's discretion by the
parents and the state are required in some circumstances.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to grant full constitutional status to children's choice rights may also be attributed
to the premise that While it is inherently unwise and unconstitutional for one adult to have power. over another adult due to
distinctions based on race, sex, national origin or ethnicity, it is
not unwise or unconstitutional for parents and the state to
impose some limitations on a child's discretion.,
Instead, as
77. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Olivas, supra note
4, at 826 ("By a variety of means, our society accords children extraordinary
protection and assistance where complex administrative judgments involve
their basic rights.").
78. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
79. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (children free
from search and seizures by school officials under a lower "reasonableness"
standard rather than the higher "probable cause" standard applied to adults);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (protecting children from
exploitation by child pornography); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (restricting obscene speech transmitted by public radio in order to
protect children); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (restricting adult access to pornographic literature in
order to protect children); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (children's due
process rights in juvenile court cases).
80. A clear cut distinction between discrimination against a child due to
age and discrimination against a person due to gender or race is that gender
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the Supreme Court has recognized, a child's dependency on a
parent or parents for sustenance and guidance is critical to the
child's preparation for the responsibilities of adulthood."1 As
Professor Coons put it: 'If theexperience of autonomy is to be
available to a child, adult authority must be its instrument, for a
child's '8freedom
to choose at all depends upon protections and
2
limits."

This relationship of dependency is in the best inter-

83
ests of children, parents, and society as a whole.

c.

The Current Status of Children's Rights

With this as the backdrop, some commentators are now
once again arguing that dependency, in whatever form, is
intrinsically wrong under certain circumstances, even in the
case of children. 4 They contend that "children's rights," in
and race are immutable characteristics whereas age is not. In other words,
children will grow out of their minority status. But see Rodham, Childien Under
the Law, supra note 34, at 507-08 (drawing a parallel between the abolition of
slavery and the emancipation of women with liberating children from the
constraints of the presumption of incapacity); NCRA Brief, infra note 106, at
7 (making the same argument using the same citation).
81. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
82. Coons, supra note 67, at 502. Professor Coons explained the reality
of parental restrictions on a child's autonomy this way:
This inescapable limit on children's freedom is not merely an
artifact of politics. It is a fact of nature. Even if one held liberty to
be the sole concern, there would remain a practical, insuperable and
permanent obstacle to liberation. Children are small, weak, and
inexperienced; adults are big, strong and initiated. One may.
liberate children from the law of man, but the law of nature is
beyond repeal. There is no way to send an eight-year-old out of the
sovereignty of the family and into the world of liberty. For there he
will be introduced to a new sovereignty of one kind or another. It
may be a regime of want, ignorance, and general oppression; it may
be one of delightful gratification. The ringmaster could be Fagin or
Mary Poppins. Whatever the reality, it will be created by people
with more power and by the elements. Children - at least small
children - will not be liberated; they will be dominated.
Id. at 503.
83. See, Minow, supra note 9, at 1871 (citing commentators supportive
of such a proposition); Andrew S. Watson, M.D., Children, Families, and Courts:
Before the Best Interests of the Child and Parham v. J.R., 66 VA. L. REV. 653
(1980) (freely exercised and nonreviewable parental decisionmaking
authority is essential to the healthy development of children); Note, Assessing
the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1178-79 (1984) ("The principle of minimal state
interference with parental guidance serves not only to preserve family
autonomy, but also to legitimate state authority.").
84. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianismand the Rule of Law, 66
IND. L.J. 379, 386 (1991) ("As the child grows older and develops cognitive,
experimental and emotional skills, absolute obedience to parental authority is
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the form of freedom from constraint, must be more fully recognized.8 5 Such commentators believe that the child's right to
choose should take precedence over the parents' right to raise
the child, regardless of whether the interests of the parents
conflict with those of the child.8 6 Others believe that children
have the "right" to a stable family environment, even though
this generally requires submission of the child to parental
authority. 7 Clearly, there is a dispute over what properly
comes within the parameters of "children's rights."
Currently, there is no clear trend toward increased liberation of children from parental restraint.8 8 However, the precedent provided by the In re Gregory K and In re A. W. cases,
discussed above, and the potential that views similar to Hillary
Rodham Clinton's may be promoted by members of the Clinton Administration and others, 89 may change this.
neither biologically required nor healthy for the child in a liberal democratic
society."); Martha Minow, Partof the Solution, Partof the Problem, 34 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 981, 998-99 (1987) (reviewing JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF
DISCRETION:

AUTONOMY,

COMMUNITY,

BUREAUCRACY

(1986))

(Minow

criticizes as "giving no place to children," Handler's description of a world in
which dependency relationships are obsolete and each individual is
completely autonomous from the state and others); Alison M. Brumley,
Comment, Parental Control Over a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal Court, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 333, 338 n.18 (Winter 1991) (child's dependency on parents
inconsistent with child's privacy rights, so parents should not be notified
when child is suing on own behalf to assert a privacy interest).
For a feminist's view on relationships of dependency within a family
setting, see Elizabeth Rappaport, On the Future of Love: Rousseau and the Radical
Feminists, in WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY:

TOWARD A THEORY OF LIBERATION

(Carol C. Gould & Marx W. Wartofsky eds., 1980) (arguing that love between
a husband and wife is a destructive dependency relationship for both
spouses).
85. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 74 (arguing that because there is
no significant difference between the reasoning capacities of adults and
adolescents, adolescents should be granted the same rights as adults).
86. See, e.g., Brumley, supra note 84, at 335 (contending that a child
deemed mature by the court should be permitted to disregard opposing
parental views in pursuing a legal claim in federal court and that even
immature children should be allowed to pursue such claims independently
following a judicial determination that it would be in the child's best
interests).
87. See, e.g., John J. Musewicz, The Failureof Foster Care: Federal Statutory
Reform and the Child's Right to Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633 (1981)
(advocating recognition of child's liberty interest in a stable family
environment).
88. See Michele D. Sullivan, Note, From Warren to Rehnquist: The Growing
Conservative Trend in the Supreme Court's Treatment of Children, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1139 (1991).

89. Ms. Clinton has made it clear that "children's issues" are high on
her priority list. Baird Flap, supra note 29, at 29. However, it is still unclear
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Parental Rights and Obligations

Although Plato believed differently,9" experience suggests
that society is best served by parents raising their children. 9 '
As Justice McReynolds wrote in Pierce v. Society of Sisters:9 2 "The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize him and prepare him for additional obligations."9 3 Continued adherence to this view preserves the
diversity of democracy by ensuring that children's views are
shaped not by the state but by parents having different backgrounds and philosophies.9 4 Perhaps it is for this reason that
public education, in general, is intentionally non-partisan and
remains neutral on most controversial issues, leaving it up to
parents to teach their children regarding such significant matters as value orientation and personal life philosophy.9 5
The Supreme Court, in Pierce and other cases, has made
clear that parents enjoy a constitutional right to raise their chilwhat her specific goals concerning children are or how they will be pursued.
Id.
90. In his book The Republic, which represented an ideal society, Plato
depicted his belief that society would be best served if children were taken
away from their parents at birth and raised by the community.
91. See generally Coons, supra note 67, at 501-10 (and sources cited
therein); Paul Schwartz, Note, Parental Rights and the Habilitation Decisionfor
Mentally Retarded Children, 94 YALE L.J. 1715, 1715 (1985) (arguing "that
habilitation decisions for mentally retarded children in residential care are
best made by their parents, and not by public employees, such as mental
health workers, as is the current practice").
92. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
93. Id. at 535.
94. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 114 ("[T]he homogenization of
values that would result if parental rights were undermined would fall
heaviest on those politically defenseless racial, economic, ethnic, and
religious groups whose values, beliefs, and childrearing habits are not
reflected in American elite culture. Indeed, courts and commentators have
often noted the link between family autonomy and social pluralism.")
(citations omitted); Leslie J. Harris, The Utah Child Protection System: Analysis
and Proposalsfor Change, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 1, 21, 91-92 (diffusing authority
over how children are raised promotes social and cultural diversity). Cf
Coons, supra note 67, at 510 ("[T]he family (almost without regard to
lifestyle) tends to be the fight environment for the child's gradual transition
from a dependent and dominated infancy to an adolescence marked by an
ever increasing practical liberty bestowed by parents. In the run of families
the child achieves formal autonomy at eighteen almost without a ripple.").
95. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943)
(declaring unconstitutional statute which required children to salute the
American flag and recite the pledge of allegiance and subjected parents to
fines and jail terms for failing to require their children to comply with the
statute).
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dren as they see fit -so long as their conduct vis-a-vis the child
does not fall below a minimal threshold of "unfitness." 9 6 Some
commentators now assert that this right relegates children to
property status and is an invidious form of "liberty" in that it
grants rights to the parents "to control another human being"
while leaving the child "voiceless. '9 7 These arguments are
similar to those raised by feminists concerning repression by a
male-dominated power structure. However, the premise is fundamentally different: Whereas adult women, absent mental illness or developmental disorders, have full capacity to make
decisions affecting their long-term interests, children generally
do not have the capacity to make such decisions.
The right of parents to raise their children historically
stems from two sources: (1) an inherent right that antedates
the state,9 8 or (2) a duty conferred by the state. Regardless of
the source, this right is protected by the Constitution 99 and is
in the best interests of society because parents are the best
decisionmakers for their children.' 0 0 This is reflected by the
96. See also Coons, supra note 67, at 510-13 (discussing Supreme
Court's protection of parental decisionmaking); Guggenheim, supra note 3, at
112-13 ("[O]ur Constitution prohibits the state from exercising broad power
to tell parents how to raise their own children.").
97. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 47.
98. John Locke wrote that God gave parents the task of raising a child
in order to facilitate development of the child's capacity to reason
preparatory to the child exercising his or her freedom upon reaching
adulthood. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II at § 58
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (3d ed. 1698) (discussed in Woodhouse, supra note
47, at n.186.). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (recognizing that the relationship of
natural parents and their children is one "having its origins entirely apart
from the state").
99. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that
Amish parents possessed a protected First Amendment right to remove their
children from public schools after completion of the eighth grade); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that parents have the right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to select the schools which their children
will attend); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment gives parents the right to allow teachers to instruct
their children in a foreign language); see also Gene D. Skarin, The Role of the
Petitioner'sAttorney in Family Court Child Protective Proceedings, in CHILD ABUSE,
NEGLECT, AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 377 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice

Course Handbook, 1992) ("Fundamental constitutional principles of due
process and protected privacy interests prohibit governmental interference
with the liberty of a parent to supervise and rear a child except upon a
showing of overriding necessity.").
100. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979); Coons, supra
note 67, at 505-10; see also Note, supra note 83, at 1178 ("A long line of cases
has established the [Supreme] Court's view that child-rearing is the role of
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fact that, following twenty years of reflection since "children's
liberation" promoters first urged the freeing~of children from
their "powerlessness" by granting them increased autonomy
from parental restrictions, courts and legislatures have steadfastly refused to impose significant limits on the parents' right
to make decisions on behalf of their children.' 0 '
Nevertheless, despite the protections consistently granted
deserving parents concerning their right to make decisions on
behalf of their children, attorneys are currently allowed under
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) to
compromise this right where a child is the attorney's client.
Under the current Model Rules, an attorney is free to disregard
the wishes of the parents of.a child-client in favor of the lawyer's own views or the views of the child, thereby threatening
violation of the parents' constitutionally protected right to raise
their child in the absence of a judicial or administrative finding
of parental unfitness. The impetus behind an attorney disregarding parental direction may be the attorney's desire to promote a particular cause. Where the attorney places priority on
the interests of the cause rather than the interests of the childclient and his or her parent, an ethical impropriety has
occurred, but the attorney is subject to no penalty. Therefore,
it is imperative that the Model Rules be amended to reflect the
general proposition that, under most circumstances, parents
are the appropriate decisionmakers for their children.'" 2
parents, not of impersonal political institutions."); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 5, at 12 ("[T]he state is too crude an instrument to becomean adequate
substitute for flesh and blood parents.").
101. See Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional
Authority: Public Schools as Mediating Institutions, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 681
(1987).

102.

GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 118-21, 127-29 (In re Gault and

its progeny stand for the proposition that while a child may have the righ.t to
counsel under certain circumstances, fit parents have the right to direct their
child's attorney, because the child's right to an attorney is possessed by the
family collectively and not the child individually.). But see Stanley Z. Fisher,
Parents' Rights and Juvenile CourtJurisdiction: A Review of Before the Best Interests of
the Child, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 835, 844 (Gault does not resolve who is
to direct child's attorney).
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THE INHERENT DANGER IN TAKING THE DECISIONMAKING
POWER FROM DESERVING PARENTS AND GIVING IT TO
THE CHILD, THE COURT, OR THE CHILD'S
ATTORNEY -

WHERE THE CAUSE
103
BECOMES THE CLIENT

Due to the broad discretion which attorneys representing
child-clients possess as to the scope and objectives of the litigation, several dangers exist. For instance, certain child advocacy
organizations believe that the child should control the litigation
seemingly regardless of the child's age or maturity. 14 Such
organizations have begun to operate on a local and national
scale.' 0 5 Due to some children's inability to afford counsel,
children often turn to such organizations seeking legal
representation.
One national organization, The National Child's Rights
Alliance (NCRA), submitted a brief amicus curiae in the Gregory
K case. 0 6 Significantly, NCRA sought recognition of nearly all
of the "children's rights" that Hillary Rodham Clinton articulated in her early legal writings."0 7 Thus, NCRA asserted that
children should have the unlimited right to sue in their own
103. This phrase comes from Robert Mnookin's book, IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAw REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 9, at 516. In this book, Professor Mnookin and several other noted
family law scholars study five cases dealing with child advocacy groups
bringing cases largely on behalf of children. Several of these cases were filed
in pursuit of expanded "children's rights." In summarizing the conclusions
reached through the studies, Professor Mnookin commented that:
In each of our studies, although the litigation began because of the
immediate needs of particular individuals, the litigation soon took
on a life of its own. The 'cause' - as defined by the advocacy
groups - became the client. Moreover, where the court appointed
separate counsel to represent a class of children, the advocates'
positions not surprisingly reflected their own views about what was
best for children.
Id.
104. This is not to criticize all public interest law firms and
organizations which focus on representing children. Many of these groups
have made great contributions to the welfare of children, especially poor and
underprivileged children.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 106-35.
106. Brief for the National Child's Rights Alliance, In re Gregory K.,
Case No. 92-839-CA-01 (5th Cir. Fla. 1992) [hereinafter NCRA Brief).
Obviously, NCRA, as amicus curiae, had no attorney-client relationship with
Gregory K. However, the overstatements made by the group to the court in
their brief and to the media illustrate the temptation attorneys face to
promote the cause over the client where ethical standards allow the attorney
to direct the scope and course of the litigation.
107. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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name for termination of parental rights.'" 8 As preconditions to
achieving such a right on behalf of Gregory K. and other children, NCRA also sought recognition of "(1) the standing and
capacity of a minor to take such action, (2) the 'family rights' of
children independent of the biological parent's right to maintain a relationship with his/her child, and (3) the right of children to representation by counsel to assert and protect their
fundamental rights."' 0 9 The brief then attacked the minority
status of children, likening it to slavery and the disenfranchisement of women. 0 NCRA further argued that any laws containing classifications based on age should be subjected to
strict scrutiny."'
Because NCRA sought recognition of these rights in the
setting of an actual case, it provides an interesting illustration
of the potential conflicts which could arise where the best interests of an NCRA child-client would oppose the NCRA's stated
goals.1 2 For example, NCRA's national coordinator recently
told the New York Times that she believes that children should
"have the right to be heard in court just as soon as they can talk
....We have had experience with children as young as 3 years
old saying, 'I don't want to live here anymore....' We feel that
all children should have the right to know what their civil rights
are and have access to the people who can help them assert
those rights."'' 3 Such rhetoric implies that this organization
fails to recognize the importance of the role of parents in a
child's decisionmaking process, especially where the child's
rights may be affected by litigation in which the child is
involved.
Another organization offering children the opportunity to
personally direct the course of litigation is the Children's Legal
108. NCRA Brief, supra note 106, at 4.
109. Id. NCRA argued that the presumption of incapacity constitutes
"legal demeaning of children which should be swept into the ash can of
history." Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 7 (citing Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doras Jonas Freed, A Bill of
Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972)).
111. Compare id. at 10 with Rodham, Children Under the Law, supra note
34, at 512.
112. Ironically, NCRA's brief argued that appointment of a guardian ad
litem was insufficient to protect a child's rights because the guardian ad litem
"is only bound to do what [he or she] thinks is in the minor's best interests,
and cannot be counted on to pursue the minor's goal and assert the minor's
rights." NCRA Brief, supra note 106, at 11. However, under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, this is probably what an attorney hired by the child
should do as well.
113. Boy Sues, supra note 14, at A 1l.
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Clinic, which opened its doors in Chicago on September 1,
1992. The stated mission of the Clinic is "to make sure that
children have a voice of their own."' 1 4 This organization has
refused to accept available public funds "so it can focus on the
rights of youngsters without being bound by federal rules
requiring families to be reunited."" 5 One of the Clinic's board
members, Chicago-Kent Law Professor Ralph Brill "thinks that
the legal system pays too much attention to adults. All we are
trying to do is get some rights for the kids themselves." This
approach has been publicly supported by several attorneys in
the Chicago area. For example, Diane Redleaf, attorney for the
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago's Children's Rights
Project, welcomed the "[Cllinic's support in 'doing what kids
want.' "116
However, other children's organizations in Chicago contend that the Clinic's "mission to empower children at all costs
can be irresponsible."' '" One Clinic critic is Cook County Public Guardian Patrick Murphy, whose office has represented over
14,000 children in various proceedings. While Mr. Murphy
welcomes additional advocates willing to represent children, he
points out that allowing a child to have the exclusive right to
direct an attorney may be unwise: "My 10-year-old son would
eat ice cream all night and watch R-rated movies, but I say 'no,'
and that is my job as an adult. My job as a lawyer is not to cave
in to every goofy whim of a client, particularly a child.""' 8 Professor Guggenheim expresses a similar view on the general
issue of absolute representation of a child's wishes:
Infants, for example, lack even the linguistic capacity to
instruct counsel. Slightly older children, on the other
hand, are capable of directing an attorney; nevertheless,
to allow a child of age five to instruct counsel would be
problematic. As attorneys experienced in this field are
114. Legal Clinic Tries to Do Justice to Rights of Kids, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Nov.
23, 1992, at 16 [hereinafter Clinic Tries to Do Justice] (quoting the executive
director of the Children's Legal Clinic).
115. Id.
116. Id. The Legal Assistance Foundation provided attorneys to the
girl in In re A. W., discussed above. These attorneys agreed to advocate on the

girl's behalf her desire to resume unsupervised, overnight visits with the
child's stepfather, who had previously been convicted of sexually assaulting
the child and subsequently served four years in prison for that crime.
117. Id. The article also cited a spokesman for the Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services, who asserted that "[t]he best interest of the
child is not always what the child wants," id., a sentiment echoed by many
courts and commentators.
118. Id.
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aware, many young. children equivocate when asked
about their preferences or views on a matter; thus, having
an attorney take his guidance from the child may result in
practice in the attorney taking whatever position he himself thinks best. More fundamentally, very young children lack the capacity to make considered and intelligent
choices. While the attorney need not and should not
ignore the child's wishes in the litigation, most readers
would agree that the attorney ought not be bound by
those wishes.' 9
Because the Model Rules fail to give guidance on the
proper course which attorneys should follow in determining
whether the child-client is capable of being treated like an adult
client, it is completely up to the attorney to decide whether to
follow the child's wishes.' 2 ° As Professor Guggenheim puts it:
"Lawyers are accustomed to doing their client's bidding. The
lawyer who represents the young child, however, finds himself
in a new, and rather intoxicating, situation. Now it is he, and
not the nominal client, who has the power to control the course
of the litigation.""' ' This is especially significant in light of the
fact that studies have shown that judges often rely heavily on
the child's counsel in making determinations concerning the
child's future as well as the futures of other members of the
child's family.'
At times this may pit the wishes of the parents
against the wishes of the child's attorney, a conflict which
should fall in favor of the parents under the established right of
parents to raise their children as they see fit, unless the parents
119. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 93-94.
120. This assumes that the parents have been disqualified as the
otherwise proper decisionmaker for the minor. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 5, at 118-29 (where counsel is appointed for a child in delinquency
proceedings, it the parents and not the child who should control the
attorney).
121. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 79.
122. See, e.g., KimJ. Landsman & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyeringfor
the Child. Principles of Representationin Custody and Visitation DisputesArising From
Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1179-80 (1978) (study involved attorneys
representing children in divorce cases). Also significant is that in custody
proceedings, each parent has an attorney advocating custody for his or her
client. Where the child also has an attorney, the views of that attorney may
tip the balance in favor of one party or the other in close cases. See
Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 103-06 ("[F]or every [attorney] who advocates a
particular result, one can easily find a different [attorney] who would urge the
opposite outcome. In the end, it will be the child's attorney, and not the
judge, who decides the case.").
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have forfeited their parental23 rights through abuse, neglect or
abandonment of the child.'
An example of an attorney possibly disregarding the
wishes of her child-clients is found in Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER). 24 In OFFER,
foster parents and a foster parents organization sought declaratory and injunctive relief against New York State and New York
City officials, claiming that the procedures used to remove foster children from foster homes violated the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the course of the proceedings before the district court, the
judge appointed a lawyer to represent both the seven named
foster children and the much larger class of foster children who
were also parties to the litigation. In reviewing the actions of
the attorney representing the children in OFFER, Professors
Wald and Chambers noted that the attorney failed to ascertain
the specific needs and wishes of her plaintiff class.' 2 5 Instead,
the attorney based her actions on her own experience with the
New York foster care program and substantially aligned herself
with defendants, a position in direct conflict with those of the
named plaintiffs she ostensibly represented.' 2 6 The attorney
for the children also declined an invitation to divide the children into two separate classes, even though such an action
2 7
could have arguably better protected her client's interests.1
Such conduct suggests that where an attorney represents a
"cause," such as child-welfare reform, there is a danger that the
children whose cases are used as a vehicle to move the reform
123. For example, if attorneys with a specific organization often
represent children who have been abused, and the goal of the organization is
to remove children from abusive situations rather than attempt to reunite the

family, then the lawyer with that organization may believe the allegations of
abuse by a child even where those allegations are untrue. "If this occurs on a
regular basis, the outcome in child protective proceedings will be
systematically skewed toward removal." Id. at 106.
124. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) [hereinafter OFFER].
125. David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v. OFFER: The
Story, in IN THE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC
POLICY, supra note 9, at 75, 93.
126. Id. at 88-93.
127. Id. at 94. Though class actions are largely beyond the scope of
this article, OFFER provides an appropriate illustration of the very real
temptations luring counsel for a class to promote a cause over the specific
needs of the class members. Test-case litigation brought on a class action
basis allows the attorney free-rein since the attorney's duty runs to the class
as a whole and not just to the named plaintiffs. Cf Aryeh Neier, Book
Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1983) ("The efforts of the public
interest advocate all too often obscure those of the client .... ").
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forward will have their individual best interests knowingly or
unknowingly sacrificed by the attorney for the sake of the
cause. 2 ' Professor Mnookin has accurately described the
attorney-client relationship itself as conducive to sacrificing the
best interests of the particular client for the sake of a general
cause:
The problem of ensuring that advocates work
towards the best interests of the client is inherent in any
system which uses counsel to represent clients. Where
one party is given the authority to put forward another's
interests, there is always the danger that the agent will
not be faithful to the interests of his client. The agent
may have misperceived something to be in the client's
best interest when it actually is not. Finally, wherever
power is delegated, there is always the potential and
incentive for the agent
to put his own interests ahead of
29
those of his client. 1

Professor Mnookin notes that, while these problems are inherent in all attorney-client relationships, the problems are exacerbated where the client is a child.'3 0
128. One of the plaintiff's attorneys in OFFER, commenting on two of
her co-counsel in the case, made the following statement which reveals the
dilemma children's rights advocates face when representing children:
"You've got two people, you know, who are for children's rights and they
love children, and the fact is that they are really doing what the hell each of
them wants. And there's no restraint on what they do. The kids are
manipulable. And I struggle with this a lot, simply in trying to have some sort
of a respectable position for myself to live with." Chambers & Wald, supra
note 125, at 94-95 (interview with Louise Gans); see also Robert L. Rabin,
Lawyers for Social Change: Perspective on PublicInterest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207,
234 (1976) ("[Wlhen a public interest law firm identifies a critical issue, it
rarely has any trouble finding a client who is willing to pursue the matter.");
Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 154-55 ("When lawyers are assigned to speak
for children, we are assured only that another adult will be heard; with the
class and cultural differences that separate many lawyers from their clients,
what the lawyer has to say frequently tells us nothing about what the child
wants or needs.").
129. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 54. As another commentator noted, this
danger is particularly extreme where an attorney represents groups of clients:
"[Tihere is an inevitable danger that the lawyer who sets out to help
disadvantaged people as members of groups may succeed in oppressing them
(or some of them) as individuals." Stephan Ellman, Client-Centeredness
Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest
Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 U. VA. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992)
(commenting on the failure of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
regulate the representation of groups).
130. Mnookin, supra note 9, at 54.
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The case of In re A. W, discussed above, provides a compelling example of this fact. In that case, attorneys for the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago, a public-interest group
which publicly advocates the right of children to have attorneys
who will advocate only what child-clients wants,'' volunteered
to represent a thirteen-year-old girl on a motion for substitution of counsel. The girl wished to have an attorney who would
argue to the juvenile court on her behalf that she should be
permitted to resume unsupervised, overnight visits with her
stepfather, a man who was convicted of long-term sexual abuse
of the child and served four years in prison for that crime.
After the attorneys for the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago were granted the motion for substitution, 3 2 they then,
proceeded to argue the case according to the expressed wishes
of their child-client.
The Assistant Public Guardian assigned to argue against
the visits, Miriam Solo, found the case particularly disturbing.
She indicated that the more evidence she heard as the hearings
proceeded, the more convinced she became that "it would be
very dangerous for the girl to return to her stepfather's home
for unsupervised visits."' '1

3

Moreover, Ms. Solo was troubled

and alarmed when the girl's attorneys sought to suppress evidence which strongly indicated that the visits should not
occur. ' The attorneys did so despite the fact that much of the
evidence which they sought to suppress was critical for the
court to have in the record in order to make an informed decision serving the long-term best interests of the child.'3 5
In re A. W. seems to be a case in which the attorneys for the
child may have put their cause - granting children increased
autonomy by giving children the right to an attorney who will
follow their instructions and forcefully advocate for the outcome desired by the child - ahead of the needs of this particular child-client, in this case, protection from sexual abuse.
.131.

See e.g., Hoffman, supra note 25; Clinic Tries to Do Justice, supra note

114.
132. This matter is now on appeal before the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First Judicial District. A decision is expected in May 1993.
133. Telephone interview with Miriam Solo, Assistant Public Guardian
(Mar. 23, 1993).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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REPRESENTING CHILDREN AND THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT -

IT Is

TIME FOR A

CHANGE

A.

Background

1. Representing the Child
One of the most difficult tasks an attorney can undertake is
to represent a minor. As has been previously discussed, such
representation is difficult for many reasons, among them are:
the uncertainty over the proper role of the attorney in legal
proceedings involving minors, potential ethical conflicts which
occur when an attorney represents a minor, and questions over
who has the right to control the course of the proceeding.
These issues have traditionally arisen where the child is suing
on his or her own behalf and where the attorney has been hired
by the parents or appointed by the state. However, because
children today are increasingly given the right to their own
counsel in various types of proceedings, and because children
might now begin to sue on their own behalf with greater frequency, more attorneys will face these problems than ever
before. Thus, it is important for attorneys representing children to recognize the myriad problems which may confront
them.
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of guidance available to
attorneys representing children. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit
have remarked that "legislators, judges, and commentators
(including ourselves) have failed to clarify how the role of the
lawyer for the child-client may differ from his-role in relation to
adult clients."' 3 6 Likewise, Professor Guggenheim has noted
his surprise at the lack of guidance the Supreme Court and
other federal and state courts have offered on the proper role
of attorneys representing children of any age. 137 Statutes, even
those expressly authorizing a child's right to counsel in certain
proceedings, also fail to specify the proper role and obligations
of an attorney representing a child.' 3" Moreover, as discussed
below,' 39 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, one of the
136.

GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 116-17 (footnote omitted).

137. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 95-97 (discussing examples of cases
in which courts simply told the attorneys to act in the best interest of the child
but failed to provide any guidance whatsoever on how this important task was
to be accomplished).
138. See id. at 96-97 (statutory guidance to attorneys representing
children is "uninstructive").
139. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
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standards by which attorneys must measure their conduct,
also fail to give any real guidance on how the ethical and practical obligations of an attorney differ when the attorney is representing a child rather than an adult. Without any guidance
from any of these sources, the attorney is left alone to determine how his or her role and obligations differ when the client
is a child. 14 1 This poses dangers for the child-client where the
child's attorney uses this freedom to pursue a course other than
42
one in the best interest of that particular child.'

2.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
are designed to provide ethical guidelines to attorneys. 4 The
Model Rules' treatment of the situation in which children are
clients is deficient, however, because the Model Rules fail to
take into account the variety of circumstances under which an
attorney may be called upon, or may volunteer, to represent a
child. The Model Rules also do not delineate the proper role
of the child, the child's parents or the attorney, where the client
is the child. Instead, the Model Rules simply counsel that an
attorney should treat a minor
client as any other client "as far
144
as reasonably possible."'
a.

The Preamble to the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct

The preamble of the Model Rules gives advice to the lawyer on his or her role and responsibilities as a legal professional. However, this language is problematic when applied to
the representation of children. For example, the first clause in
the preamble states that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients. " 4 5 However, if an attorney has been appointed by the
140.

MODEL

RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT

pmbl.

(1992)

[hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("many of a lawyer's professional duties are
prescribed in the Model Rules").
141. Perhaps for this reason, the American Bar Association recently
convened a panel of experts on the representation of children to discuss the
proper role of attorneys representing children in a variety of contexts.
Hoffman, supra note 25, at B6. The panel eventually agreed that standards
for children's representatives should, and will, be drafted. Id.
142. These dangers are discussed more fully supra part III.
143. MODEL RULES, supra note 140, Rule 1.14(a).

144.

The ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in

1983. This body of rules is designed to replace the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. A majority of states have now adopted the

Model Rules, some altering the text of the rules in certain areas. The Model
Rules are still under consideration in some states.
145. MODEL RULES, supra note 140, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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court to represent the "best interests" of a very young child,
then does the primary duty of the attorney run to the court or
the child's parents, in seeming contradiction of the Model
Rules, or does it run to the child?' 4 6 Moreover, if the attorney's primary duty is to the child-client, then is that attorney
restricted from advocating a "cause" which may run contrary to
the best interests of that particularchild despite the fact that the
attorney believes that the "cause" he or she is promoting, if
adopted, would better the welfare of most children generally?
The lawyer in this position could justify his or her position by
pointing to language in the preamble which states that "a lawyer should seek improvement of the law" as support for such
conduct.' 4 7 Clearly, in that attorney's mind, adoption of his or
her "cause" would be an improvement in the law even if that
view is not shared by a majority of the legal profession. 4 '
Further complicating matters is the preamble's explanation of the various functions which an attorney should perform
in representing a client. Consider the following language:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with
an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and
obligations and explains their practical implications. As
advocate, the lawyer zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with the requirements of honest dealing with
others. "
Where the client is a child lacking legal capacity to make binding decisions, the meaning of these functions certainly changes.
For example, where the child is very young, it makes no sense
to require the attorney to attempt to provide the child-client
with an informed understanding of the child's legal rights and
obligations. Instead, the lawyer should present this information to the child's parents if they are not disqualified or their
interests are not in conflict with the child's, or to the guardian
ad litem where the parents are not available or have lost their
146. See Lyon, supra note 5, at 693 ("Model Rule 1.14 is flawed because
it does not articulate a standard for determining when the child should not be
treated like other clients or how the case should be directed when the child is
not treated like a normal client.").
147. Id.
148. Moreover, the Comment to Rule 1.3 states that "[a] lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued." MODEL RULES, supra note 140, Rule 1.3 cmt.
149. Id.
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right to act on the child's behalf. If there is no guardian ad
litem, then the attorney may view her or his role as a de facto
guardian ad litem and inform the court of the options available
to the child. This is the way it should be. However, under the
current Model Rules, the attorney could justifiably conclude
that he or she has discretion to determine what the position of
the child should be and then "zealously advocate" that position. No ethical check or balance on the exercise of that discretion now exists.
Where the child is older, the attorney must then determine
to what extent .the child has the right to control the litigation.
There is no clear guidance in the Model Rules concerning who
should control the litigation in this instance. Should it be the
parents unless they are unfit? What if the parents have a dispute with the child over lifestyle choices and the child takes
them to court over it? What should-the role of the judge be in
determining the competence of the child to direct the litigation? These questions remain open to speculation under the
current Model Rules.
b.

Model Rule 1.2 Scope of the Representation

Model Rule 1.2 suggests that an attorney should abide by
the wishes of the client concerning the proper objectives of the
representation. 150 Because elsewhere the Rules state that the
150. The rule provides:
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and
(e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.
In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
(b)

(c)
(d)

(e)

testify.
A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the
client consents after consultation.
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but
a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.
When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not
permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the
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attorney should, to the extent possible, treat the minor-client
as any other client,'-' this suggests that the child should be
able to control the objectives of the litigation "to the extent
possible." The most reasonable interpretation of the interplay
between these two rules is that the attorney should act according to the wishes of the child to the extent that the attorney
believes that the child is competent to direct the attorney. If
the child is not competent to direct the attorney, then, to that
extent, the attorney cannot treat the child like any other client.
This is problematic because it requires the attorney to
make a judgment call on "competence." This is a threshold
question with no criteria expressed in the Model Rules. This
creates the temptation for an attorney who represents a specific
cause to more easily decide that the child is not competent to
direct the attorney, freeing the attorney to take a desired
approach to the proceeding that may promote a general cause
without protecting the needs and rights of that specific childclient. Likewise, this also creates an incentive for an attorney
who believes in child autonomy to allow the child to direct the
attorney. This may be inappropriate, and even dangerous, in
cases such as In re A. W., discussed above, due to limitations on
children's competence to make immediate decisions that best
serve their long-term rather than short-term interests.' 5 2
Moreover, the constitutional right of fit parents to make decisions on behalf of their minor children would thereby be
circumvented.
c.

Model Rule 1.14 Client Under a Disability

The section of the Model Rules which most clearly applies
to the legal representation of children is Rule 1.14 "Client
Under a Disability." This rule provides as follows:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant
limitations on the lawyer's conduct.
Id. Rule 1.2.
151. Id. Rule 1.14.
152. These same concerns also relate to Rule 1.3, which requires that
the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed so that the client has
"sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so." Here, as in
Rule 1.2, the attorney must make a threshold determination of the ability of
the child-client to direct the attorney, and this determination affects the
extent of the lawyer's ethical obligations to the child-client.
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is impaired, whether because of minority, mental
disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or
take other protective action with respect to a client,
only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot reasonably act in the client's best
interest. 153
The Comment to this section indicates that despite the child's
legal incapacity, the child should be consulted where feasible.' 54 The Comment also acknowledges the intermediate
degrees of competence which exist among minors. The Comment refers only to the custody proceeding, but in so doing,
suggests that children as young as five should have the opportunity to express a custody preference to the person or entity
making the custody determination.
Another important aspect of the Comment to Rule 1.14 is
its guidance on the appointment of a legal guardian. The Comment provides that where a legal representative has been
appointed for the minor-client, the attorney should look to that
legal representative for guidance on how to proceed. The
Comment goes on to state that where a legal representative has
not been appointed, but the attorney believes that it would be
in the best interests of the client to have such a representative
appointed, the attorney should seek that appointment. Despite
the detail with which the Comment treats the appointment of a
legal guardian, the Comment completely overlooks the parental role in a child's decisionmaking process.
A troubling entry in the Comment to Rule 1.14 is that
where the attorney represents a minor or a person suffering
from a disability, and the disclosure of that disability would
adversely affect the client's interest, the attorney is in an
"unavoidably difficult" situation regarding whether the attorney should disclose the disability. This is problematic because
often the attorney is acting not as an advocate but as investigator or factfinder whose role is to provide the judge with additional information relevant to the decision at hand. If the
attorney conveys the wishes of the child-client but does not
disclose the fact that the attorney believes that the child is
153. Id. Rule 1.14.
154. The commentary states that "a client lacking legal competence
often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions
about matters affecting the client's own well-being." Id. Rule 1.14 cmt.
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completely incapable of offering a reasonable opinion, then the
attorney has fulfilled the dictates of the Model Rules but has
failed to fulfill his or her proper role as an investigator. And if
the attorney were to disclose the inability of the child-client to
offer a reasonable opinion, then the client would be breaching
Model Rule 1.14. This and other shortcomings in the Model
Rules suggest that an amendment to the Model Rules is
needed.
B.

Proposal- Amendment of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to Provide Guidelines to Attorneys Representing
Children

As the discussion above illustrates, generally it is unwise to
allow either the attorney of a child-client or the child himself or
herself to control the scope and course of litigation where parents have not forfeited their right to make decisions on behalf
of their minor children. In order to provide guidelines for
attorneys representing minors which protect deserving parents'
rights to raise their children, the ABA should adopt an amendment to the Model Rules. A more detailed practice guide,
which is likely to come from the ABA committee that is currently considering standards for attorneys representing children, should provide more specific guidance to attorneys
representing children in a variety of situations and should, of
course, be made widely available. Also desirable would be
requiring some type of training for attorneys who have no
experience representing children but wish to do so. Such programs would necessarily need to be implemented and run by
the various state bar organizations.
An amendment to the Model Rules would be the least
expensive, most effective means of providing attorneys a standard by which to measure their conduct. This is so because
nearly all states require attorneys to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which tests lawyers' knowledge of
the Model Rules. Therefore, lawyers entering practice would
quickly become familiar with the amendment. Other attorneys
would likely learn about the amendment through continuing
legal education courses or by word of mouth.
One possible amendment which would minimize the dangers of unrestricted representation of child-clients described
above would be the following revision of Model Rule 1.14:155
155. For a related proposal, see Lyon, supra note 5, at 694-95.
Although the direction of the two proposed amendments is substantially
different, some of the language is the same.
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If the client is a minor represented by an attorney,
the parent or parents have a rebuttable right to
direct the course of the representation. If the interests of the parent or parents conflict with those of
the child, or the parent or parents have been found
"unfit" by an authorized agency or court, or the parent or parents are otherwise unable to direct the
course of the representation, then this presumption
is overcome.
(1) If this presumption is overcome, then the
child's guardian ad litem shall direct the course
of the representation.
(2) If there is no guardian ad litem, the lawyer shall
seek a judicial determination of whether the
child is competent to direct the attorney. If the
court determines that the child is sufficiently
mature to direct the attorney, the attorney shall
maintain a normal attorney-client relationship
with the child.
(i) In making this competency determination,
the court may use rebuttable presumptions
concerning typical ages at which minors
possess the requisite maturity to make
competent decisions on various issues as
reflected in current statutes.
(ii) If the court determines that the minor
lacks sufficient capacity to direct the attorney, the court shall appoint a neutral
guardian ad litem to direct the course of
representation.
Adoption of this language would ensure that parental
rights in participating in important decisions over a child's
future are protected where the parents have not forfeited their
rights in this regard. Where parents have forfeited their rights,
such as in In re A. W., attorneys would have a specific course to
pursue ensuring that immature children would not be -permitted to independently direct their attorney at the expense of the
child's own long-term best interests. This amendment would
also ensure that the attorney would have less discretion to unilaterally control the course of the litigation. Restricting the
attorney's discretion in this manner would protect children
from potentially unscrupulous counsel tempted to misuse the
judicial process.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Attorneys representing children are faced with many difficult issues, such as who should control the course of the litigation and whether the child's wishes should be taken into
account where the child is not the one directing the litigation.
These decisions have ethical overtones and should be
addressed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the Model Rules do not yet adequately address such
issues. Because of the increasing frequency with which attorneys may now be confronted with such difficult decisions, it is
in the best interests of the legal profession and society for
guidelines to be promulgated. In addition, courts and legislatures will soon have to address the extent to which minors can
bring suit in their own name and the proper subject matter for
such suits. For the reasons stated in this article, when considering adoption of a "children's right" to independently bring
suit, courts and legislatures should keep in mind the valid reasons behind the presumption of children's legal incapacity and
the importance of parental participation in children's decisionmaking where there has been no finding of parental unfitness
and there is no conflict of interest. If they are able to do so, the
likelihood of children successfully bringing suit against their
parents in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness or a
conflict of interest between the parents and the child would be
diminished. Moreover, under such a philosophy, children will
continue to enjoy the protections and supervision they need to
fully and naturally blossom into adulthood.

